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ABSTRACT:
In current affairs a central issue in the media is Islamic fundamentalism. Various 
reactions to American foreign policy have divided the globe into a dichotomy supporting or 
rejecting terrorism. While Middle Eastern countries have received significant attention, other 
Islamic countries have been largely ignored. Indonesia can be a primary example for an analysis 
of how Islam exists outside of the Middle East.
The purpose of this research is to consider the initial development of political Islam in 
Indonesia. This development will consider the level of influence Islam had during the drafting of 
the Indonesian constitution. Also, this research will show the dynamics of Islam in a multi-ethnic 
and diverse country.
The research is designed as a historical-cultural analysis that considers the influences of 
two belief systems (Sufism and kejawen)1 during Indonesia’s initial political discourse. The 
nationalist leader and first Indonesian president, Soekamo, will be used to illustrate this 
influence.
1 Sufism is the mystical form of Islam and kejawen (Javanism) is a Javanese belief system.
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Introduction
In current affairs a central issue in the media is Islamic fundamentalism. Various 
reactions to American foreign policy have divided the globe into a dichotomy supporting or 
rejecting terrorism. Minorities of Muslims have initiated a jihad (holy war) on the Western world 
with the goal of destroying belief systems of anything differing from their radical Islamic views. 
Such fundamentalists show no signs of accepting anything less than a complete Islamic society 
governed by an Islamic state.1
The countries that have attracted the most attention are Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Other countries with large populations of Muslims, 
particularly Indonesia, have remained out of the media. This is odd; Indonesia has a functional 
democracy with a dominant Muslim population, which is something that many Westerners 
believe cannot exist. Moreover, Indonesia has largely rejected the notion of instituting Sharia 
(Islamic Law) as a primary factor in their political system (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39,46,47). 
Thus, Indonesia may serve as a primary example of how Islam exists outside of the Middle East; 
this form of Islam is ignored by the mainstream media’s representations.
Indonesia has a total population of 214,995,000 people. There are 189,195,000 Muslims, 
which is roughly 88% of the population of Indonesia. This is the largest concentration of 
Muslims out of any nation; this is roughly 13% of the worlds 1.3 billion Muslims (Fealy and 
Hooker 2006: 7, 39).2 While many Americans have a notion of what it means to be a Muslim or 
what Islam entails, it is likely a misinformed perception. Moderate Muslims and Muslim
1 The word jihad means struggle. Jihad has been misused an misunderstood primarily due to Islamic 
fundamentalists using it to define their war against non-Muslims, particularly the United States and the greater 
Western World.
2 The first set of numbers are taken from Indonesia’s central statistics agency, Biro Pusat Statistik (reported in the 
Jakarta Post, 4 July 2003), compiled for the 2004 general elections. These numbers were part of a larger table of 
total populations of Southeast Asian countries in Fealy and Hooker 2006 Voices o f Islam in Southeast Asia: a 
Contemporaiy Sourcebook Pasir Panjang Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies pp. 7.
McCabe 2
intellects far outweigh the radical fundamentalists; yet do not attract the attention of the major 
media outlets. While there are a variety of factors explaining why Islam is misunderstood, the 
first step in attempting to understand Islam is to move beyond common stereotypes and 
representations. Once again, Indonesia can be a primary example of Islam existing and 
functioning in diverse and pluralistic environments.
The purpose of this research is two-fold. First, this research will show the initial 
development of political Islam in Indonesia. This development will consider the level of 
influence Islam had in the initial drafting of the Indonesian constitution. Secondly, this research 
will provide an example of how Islam can function in a diverse region such as Indonesia. To 
clarify, Indonesia has a wide range of ethnic groups on the archipelago. The Island with the 
highest concentration of Muslims is Java with 94.1% (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39). Even with 
this large majority, there is still a large degree of variation between the types of practicing 
Muslims in Java.
The Island of Java will be the centerpiece for this paper because; it was central in the 
Indonesian independence movement. A historical-cultural framework will be used to explain 
Islam’s role into the initial Indonesian political system at the time of independence. There will 
be a discussion of kejawen (Javanism) and the Sufi belief system of the Islamic religion. Both 
are important when understanding Islam in Indonesia.
There will also be specific attention paid to the Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU), Muhammadiyah, and Masyumi. All have played a significant role in Indonesia. This will 
provide an example of specific versions of Islam and also consider the labels ‘traditionalist’ and 
modernist’. When understanding Islam’s role in Indonesian society, it is important to look at 3
3 Sufism is the mystical interpretation of Islam. Kejawen is a world-view and ideology that is strictly characteristic of 
the Javanese.
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Islamic organizations. Moreover, the account of Islamic organizations will provide an 
understanding of how Islam has functioned in Indonesia. In short, the account of Islamic groups 
will organize the large presence of Islam and how it exists in Indonesia.
The early political discourse in Indonesian politics will include the initial drafting of the 
Indonesian constitution. More specifically, there will be a discussion on Indonesia’s first 
president, Soekamo, and his ideologies.
Soekamo’s ideologies will provide an example of how diverse ideologies were brought 
together and the role Islam played during the development of the Indonesian constitution. 
Soekamo and the Djakarta Charter4 will be used to show the first political division between 
those Muslims who support a large Islamic influence in state ideology and those who do not 
(Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47). Moreover, Soekamo’s ideology will connect the previous 
examples of kejawen and Sufism to the influences during independence and the outcome of the 
\ ^  constitution.
The first section will discuss the political environment of Indonesia during the 1900’s to 
1945. There will be an overview of Islam and Islamic communities, as they exist in Indonesia. 
An account of the developments of Islamic organizations and Muslim classifications will be 
considered, as well as the competing ideologies in Indonesia during the 1900’s. Moreover, the 
Japanese occupation will be noted as it affected the major Islamic groups. Last, a brief 
introduction of Soekamo’s ideology will be incorporated (Armstrong 2002; Barton and Fealy 
1996; Beatty 1999; Fealy and Hooker 2006; Fieth and Castles 1970; Kahin 1952; Momen 1985; 
Mulder 1996; Ricklefs 1993).
4 A clause that was rejected in the drafting of the Indonesian constitution that allows for the institution of sharia law. 
The seven words in bahasa Indonesian were: Dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari ’at Islam bagi pemeluk- 
pemeluknya. These words obliged the state to implement sharia and Muslims to follow it (Fealy and Hooker 2006:
w  47>-
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The second section will discuss Javanese kejawen and Sufi mysticism. This portion will 
show how Soekamo’s ideologies were affected by these two belief systems and also illustrate the 
diverse and syncretic environment of Java. To clarify, when comparing kejawen and Sufism there 
will be attention paid to cosmology, mythology, metaphysics, and anthropology (mans place in 
the universe). Moreover, there will be a consideration of the origins of Sufi influences in Java 
and the divisions between the legal and mystical aspects of Islam. Last, there will be an 
explanation of the proposed universal principles that augment kejawen and Sufism (Beatty 1999; 
Endraswara2003; Fealy and Hooker 2006; Geertz 1960; Mulder 1996; Ricklefs 1993;
Woodward 1989).
The final section will discuss Sufi and Javanese ideology during the initial political 
development in Indonesia. This portion will consider the common aspects of a charismatic leader 
in reference to Soekamo. Soekamo’s background and early political influences will be discussed 
and how these early influences cultivated Soekamo’s ideologies. Furthermore, it is important to 
mention Soekamo’s isolation because; this is where he began to consider Islam. This will 
illustrate and explain how the previous Sufi and kejawen ideologies link to Soekamo’s political 
agenda. Finally, there will be a discussion of Soekamo’s return from isolation during the 
Japanese occupation and the subsequent declaration of independence (Bharadwaj 1997; Dham 
1969; Fealy and Hooker 2006; Legge 1972).
Thus, this paper will consist of three sections. The first section is a background of the 
political environment during Indonesia’s move toward independence. The second is a discussion 
of Sufism and kejawen. Last, Soekamo’s ideology and the drafting of the constitution during 
Indonesia’s independence. These three areas will give us an understanding of the role of Islam in
W
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Indonesia’s initial political development. More specifically, these areas will show what role 
specific forms of Islam played during the formation of the Indonesian constitution.
Background
Islam is a monotheistic religion that originated from the teachings of the prophet 
Muhammad, who was both a religious and a political figure. Muhammad was the author of the 
Qur’an, which is the sacred religious text that is central to Islamic teachings.5 Initially, the 
Qur’an was passed orally from Muhammad to his religious leaders. After Muhammad’s death in 
632 AD, the Qur’an was interpreted and taught through the four rightly guided caliphs who 
succeeded Muhammad. The word Islam means submission; that is, the total surrender to Allah 
(God). A follower of Islam is a Muslim; literally one who submits to Allah. Islam is the second 
largest religion in the world next to Christianity (Armstrong 2002: xiv, 25)6 7. There are various 
forms of Islam; the most basic division is between the Sunni and Shiite groups. This division 
resulted from a disagreement between the successor to Islam after the prophet’s death and the 
role of that successor (Momen 1985: 12).
In Indonesia, there is a wide spectrum of ummah (Islamic communities). This diversity 
includes ethnic groups, socio-economic classes, political and doctrinal orientations, and cultural 
dispositions. How to classify these ummah has been debated by scholars; however, since the 
nineteenth century four categories have dominated literature; the santri, abangan, traditionalists, 
and modernists . Traditionalists and moderates are considered sub categories of the santri. Santri
5 It should be noted that while references may show Muhammad as the ‘author’ of the Qur’an, Muslim’s believe the 
author is Allah (God), who used the prophet to create the holy book.
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam. http://en.wikipedia.orh/wiki/muhammad.
7 For more information on classification see Clifford Geertz 1960 The Religion o f Java, Chicago: the University of 
Chicago Press and M.C.Rickfels 2006 Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History o f Islamisation from the Fourteenth to the 
Early Nineteenth Centuries, New York: Eastbridge, White Plains.
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and abangan are terms used to denote Islamic piety, where the santri are those Muslims who 
adhere to the strict doctrine of Islam and the abangan Muslims are those who are less orthodox 
or ‘nominal’. The abangan practices range widely in practice, depending on the individual 
Muslim. The abangan Muslims are those whose lives have a more syncretic blend of Islam with 
various other religions; whereas to the santri, the tenants and principles of Islam are central and 
defining. Islam in Indonesia can exist in with elements of Hinduism, Buddhism, and local 
animistic belief practices. (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39,40).
Within the santri are the traditionalists and moderates, who are divided by doctrinal 
differences, which often have socioeconomic, political, and cultural interests. Traditionalists 
have two important characteristics. The first is that they wish to preserve the authoritative early 
Islamic scholarship and the second is that they tend to be more tolerant of local customs. This is 
important because it allows local beliefs and practices to augment Islam. For example, the 
veneration of wali (saints) and well-known kyai and ulama (Islamic scholars) can be 
intermediaries between God and humans. The largest traditionalist organization is Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU-Revival of the Religious Scholars), this group is dominated by Islamic scholars 
whose authority is based on the knowledge of classical Islam, NU’s membership claims 35 to 40 
million people (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39,40).
The modernists (or reformists) believe that the theology and ritual practices of the 
traditionalists are impure and deviate from the original teachings of Islam. The modernist 
movement spread to Indonesia in the early twentieth century prior to the traditionalist movement. 
The modernists critique the traditionalists in two important areas. The first is that un-Islamic 
innovations during the medieval and early modem periods corrupted the Islamic the faith and led 
Muslims to error. The second is that blind adherence to a past dogma has led to the stagnation,
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atrophy, and eventual irrelevance of Islam during colonial dominance in Indonesia. Modernists 
claim the only way to revive Islamic relevance in contemporary Indonesia is to remove these 
impurities and return to the teachings of the Qur’an and the examples of the prophet Muhammad. 
Modernists believe that Muslims should learn from Western advances to strengthen and 
modernize the Muslim community. The largest modernist organization is Muhammadiyah with a 
membership of 25 to 30 million people (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39-41).
It is important to note here, that the terms ‘traditionalist’ and ‘modernist’ can be 
misleading. Some may assume that the term ‘traditional’ equates to a form of religious 
conservatism, unwilling to consider local belief systems; however, it is the traditionalists and NU 
that show tolerance toward these local beliefs and practices. Likewise, the term ‘modernist’ 
would seemingly indicate an acceptance toward syncretic blends of Islam and flexibility in 
doctrine; to the contrary, the modernists quickly rejected Soekamo’s interpretations of Islam.
The orthodox traditionalists showed interest in Soekamo’s emphasis on the importance of 
syncretism (Dahm 1969: 196).
To understand how Islam exists in such a diverse region and how Islamic ideals have 
influenced Indonesian politics, the activities of three important Islamic groups during the 
development of Indonesian nationalism must be accounted for. These three groups originated on 
the Island of Java. As mentioned earlier, ideological concepts of pre-Islamic Javanese belief 
systems and how these beliefs have been incorporated into Islam is important.
The island of Java is located south of Borneo (Kalimantan) and east of Sumatra. Java has 
a 94.1 % Muslim majority; however, there exists a worldview that is strictly isolated to Javanese 
pre-Islamic beliefs. However, Islam and Javanese traditional thought exists inclusively rather 
than exclusively. The effects of Islamic piety on Javanese worldview weighted in Sufism will
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show how Islamic ideologies act in conjuncture with Javanese worldview (Fealy and Hooker 
2006: 49; Mulder 1996: 31; Beatty 1999:1).
Initial political thought in Indonesia was fundamentally rooted in nationalism. The 
development of independence in Indonesia was a time of intense turmoil. There was a large 
degree of political and ideological competition and conflict. Indonesian students, who were 
foreign educated, systematically assessed the Dutch colonial government and showed their 
desires for an independent Indonesian state.8 These ideals were the beliefs of secular and non­
secular reformist Muslims, the ideology of Marxist-Communism, and pro-and anti-Japanese 
nationalism. The development of Islamic groups and their ideologies had a significant influence 
on the development of Indonesia as an independent nation (Feith and Castles 1970: 1; Kahin 
1952: 64). More specifically, the development of the groups Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, 
and Masyumi, played a large role in the independence of Indonesia and its initial political 
formation. While these groups were initially apolitical, the environment of Indonesia in the 
twentieth century ensured that these groups would gain political awareness (Feith and Castles 
1970: 1; Kahin 1952: 64).
Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 in Yogyakarta, Central Java by Kiaji Ahmad 
Dahlan. This is a modernist organization that was initially apolitical, remaining Java-centric until 
Dahlan’s death in 1923. Originally centered on schools, Muhammadiyah expanded its influence 
to free clinics, poor relief, orphanages, libraries and publications of the Qur’an in the Javanese 
language. While Muhammadiyah’s original purpose was enriching Muslim culture, the 
environment of nationalism in the early twentieth century gave members of Muhammadiyah the 
drive to become politically active. Eventually Muhammadiyah’s schools were utilized as areas
8 The Dutch occupied and had a presence in Indonesia for nearly 300 years; where it was considered part of The 
Dutch East Indies. For more information see Anthony Reid 1990 Southeast Asia in The Age o f Commerce Yale 
University Press
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for promoting nationalism (Kahin 1952: 87-88). However, Ricklefs (1993) contends that 
Muhammadiyah faced significant resistance initially and the real growth of the organization was 
between 1925 and 1938 when it linked to the dynamic Islamic world of Minangkabau (Ricklefs 
1993: 171).
While Muhammadiyah is the largest modernist organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU), is the largest traditionalist movement in Indonesia. NU was formed in response to 
the growing influence of the modernist movement led by Muhammadiyah. The purpose and 
mission of NU was to defend the traditional forms of Islamic beliefs and practices against some 
of the modernist views being spread by Muhammadiyah. Wahab Chasbullah and Hasjim Asj’ari 
(Chasbullah’s mentor) organized NU in competition with Muhammidiyah for members and 
affiliates between the traditional and conservative ideologies of Islamic beliefs (Feith and Castles 
1970: 201).
While during the 1920’s and early 1930’s, the two parties were in competition, the 1940’s 
brought a period of consolidation and cooperation. In 1937 at Chasbullah’s Surabaya house, the 
representatives from Saraket Islam9, NU, and Muhammadiyah consolidated to form the Majlis 
Islam A’laa Indonesia (MIAI), with the central role of Chasbullah as a major influence and factor 
(Barton & Fealy 1996: 1-13; Fealy & Hooker 2006: 17, 27).
During the 1940’s there was a significant split in NU. This split resulted in ideological 
differences between two lines of thinking in NU. This is a division of two ideological belief 
systems and pushed the NU leadership into two polarities; the hardliners and the pragmatists.
The hardliners were those who supported a rigid adherence to doctrinal and spiritual law. These 
individuals encompassed Islamic intellectualism and had an exclusive Islamic train of thought.
9 The Islamic association formed in 1912 (successor to Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah [Islamic Comeercial Union,
1909]) and later renamed as the political party Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, which had little political success 
(Fealy and Hooker 2006: xlvii)
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The hardliners vehemently supported the notion of an Islamic state and demanded the formal 
W  recognition of Sharia law in the Indonesian constitution. The hardliners called for cooperation 
strictly between Islamic groups over non-Islamic groups and secularists. With the hardliners, 
there was no room for political dealings and compromise, nor was there an acceptance of 
syncretic blends of Islam (Barton and Fealy 1996: 18,19).
The hardliners counterparts, the pragmatists, took a less doctrinal approach to 
policymaking and action. The pragmatist’s interpretation of Sharia law took a flexible and realist 
approach. The pragmatists utilized vague and flexible interpretations to Islamic legalities. For 
example, akhaffud-dararain (choosing the lesser of two risks), was commonly used in political 
decision making and the pragmatists were much more cautious about the idea of an Islamic state. 
The notion of an Islamic State is still highly contested in contemporary Islamic circles. The 
reason for this caution is the risk of alienating non-Muslims in Indonesia; the pragmatists had 
doubts that an Islamic state would result in a more Islamic society (Barton and Fealy 1996: 19, 
20).
Muhammadiyah and NU are important examples for this research because they represent 
the flexibility of Islam, enabling it to exist in a diverse environment. While this paper will focus 
more on NU, it is important to introduce Muhammadiyah because Muhammadiyah was 
responsible for the development of NU. Also, these groups help to organize Islam on a larger 
scale, as it exists in Indonesia. The contrasts seen between modernists and traditionalists can also 
exist in individual groups.
For example, NU has similar internal conflictions between the hardliners and pragmatists. 
These internal conflictions can be used to illustrate diversity and tolerance within the 
traditionalist Muslim system. These conflictions also allow for a large amount of ideological
W
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flexibility within NU. The example of the hardliners and pragmatists within the NU organization 
shows that, although there is opposition, the group can still function as a whole and the diversity 
in these groups can attend to the diversity between the santri and abangon in Indonesia, 
particularly in Java (Kahin 1952: 106-110).
The Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 resulted (among many other things) in the 
establishment of an Indonesian army. This was essential to the Indonesian nationalist movement 
and subsequent independence. Also, the Japanese used Muslim fighters to resist a Dutch 
invasion. The methods they used are important because it provides an example of an attempt to 
consolidate the major Islamic organizations to control the Islamic population of Indonesia. The 
Japanese plans involved coercing the Indonesians using religion. The Japanese were 
unsuccessful because, they created a larger organization (Masyumi) to communicate with the 
underground resistance networks. The Masyumi organization, formed by the Japanese, worked 
as a nationalist movement seeking independence, while at the same time convincing the Japanese 
of their cooperation. Masyumi was the consolidation of the Islamic groups (the largest being 
Muhammadiyah and NU) under the Japanese occupation (Kahin 1952: 106-110; Barton and 
Fealy 1996: 17).
During the Japanese occupation, local Islamic leaders such as Chasbullah of NU were 
appointed to respected local positions, such as Shu Sangi Kai (the Regional Advisory Council). 
When the Japanese were defeated in 1945, the organization of Masyumi, still with the groups 
Muhammadiyah, NU, and Parai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, emerged as a distinct group. The chief 
objective was a functional independent Indonesia based on Islamic principles. However, the 
disagreement between the parties was in the interpretation of what Islamic principles should be 
implemented and how those principles should be applied. Once again there was a division of
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ideologies, with the traditionalists primarily from NU and the modernist reformers from 
Muhammadiyah. The Muhammadians in this group were a new and ambitious force with 
ideological goals to shape, influence, and eventually mold their society (Kahin 1952: 110, 111, 
156; Barton and Fealy 1996: 17, 18; Fealy and Hooker 2006 xliii).
In the early 1950’s NU split from Masyumi and caused an upheaval and rapid change that 
had far reaching consequences in the Islamic world and in Indonesian politics. The new 
generation of Muhammadian modernists won significant control and influence over the board of 
Masyumi. This gave the Muhammadians more control over the progressiveness in the Masyumi 
organization. Essentially, the modernists, led by Mohammad Natsir, challenged the political 
competency of the NU kyai an ulama, and changed the rules of the board to limit the influence of 
the Shu Sangi Kai, chaired by Chasbullah. This resulted in an NU walkout by their delegates, 
followed by the formal proposal for a withdrawal from Masyumi. NU’s split from Masyumi 
W  resulted in significant and rapid change in the Islamic world (Barton and Fealy 1996: 21; Kahin 
1952: 156).
The description of the formations and ideologies of these Islamic groups shows the 
diverse interactions between the various forms of Islamic thinking. Also, this account assists in 
the organization of the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia. The traditionalists, moderates, hardliners, 
pragmatists, and reformists were all seemingly at odds with how to implement Islamic ideologies 
in the newly forming Indonesian nation. The leaders of the revolution were now in prominent 
political positions of government and intensely pushing their ideologies. The compromise that 
allowed for controlled Islamic influence, while also curbing the formation of an Islamic state,
W
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was the concept ofpancasila (the five principles)10 formulated by Indonesia’s first president 
Soekamo (Feith and Castles 1970: 123).
Soekamo framed pancasila in a way that could be understood by the uneducated masses, 
but also appeal to the educated elite Indonesians who had similar nationalist and secular views. 
The nature of pancasila was influenced by Western Democracy, Moderate Islamic tendencies, 
Marxist ideals, and indigenous-village democratic and communalistic ideas, which formulated 
the general basis of social thought in Indonesia in the early twentieth century (Feith and Castles 
1970: 123).
Thus, pancasila was applicable to a variety of Indonesians with diverse ideologies, which 
seemingly defined Indonesia during the independence period. Pancasila is still applicable in 
contemporary Indonesia and still at the core of the constitution. Pancasila has five principles; the 
identification and belief in one supreme God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of 
Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberation 
amongst representatives, and the social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia (Fealy 
and Hooker 2006: 44).
While this appeals to various ideologies, one of the primary purposes for Soekamo’s 
pancasila was to prevent an Islamic state. Pancasila was more supportive of the moderate 
Islamic standpoint that addressed the concerns of the non-Muslims, who threatened to separate 
from Indonesia if it became an Islamic state. Elections in Indonesia have shown that the position 
of Islam as a primary governmental force is not welcome by the majority of the country. Even 
with Indonesia’s 88% Muslim majority, the largest support for Islamic parties in Indonesian 
elections was in 1955, when the combined results for the Islamic parties were about 40% (well
10 Pancasila, or the ‘five principles’ declare the belief in one God, a just and civilized society, national unity, 
democracy led by wisdom, and social justice (Fealy and Hooker 2003: xiv).
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below the majority needed). The Islamic groups anticipated a much larger number than they 
received. Islamic parties have never gained more than 44% of the vote in general elections and 
have not been successful in Tslamizing’ the Indonesian government (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 44, 
45).
Soekamo’spancasila provided the basis for the constitution and a compromise between 
the competing ideologies in Indonesia; however, debates and conflictions still exist within the 
Islamic groups. Both in the past and present, debates still remain about what constitutes an 
Islamic state and, indeed, if the concept of an Islamic state is flawed at the core. The role of 
Islam in Indonesian society and what specific laws to implement are still largely debated and 
contested ideologies in contemporary Indonesian politics (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 209-219).
We have an overview of the development of Indonesia as a nation state in relationship to 
the influential Islamic groups. To illustrate how a form of Islam can augment another belief 
system in a diverse environment, Kejawen and Sufism will be discussed. Sufi ideology combined 
with the Javanese belief system of kejawen (Javanism), will illustrate how the synergy between 
two belief systems can affect the outcome of Soekamo’s pancasila ideology and subsequent 
policy.
Javanese Kejawen and Sufi Mysticism
This portion of the paper will discuss kejawen (Javanism) and Sufi mysticism. Kejawen 
and Sufism are an important aspect of Islam in Java because; both play an intricate role in 
Javanese thought. This will show how aspects of both beliefs contributed to Soekamo’s 
pancasila ideology. To compare the two there will be an explanation of cosmology, mythology, 
metaphysics, and anthropology in kejawen and Sufism. More specifically, the understanding of 
rasa (feeling), mans place in the universe (and mans relationship to God), and the macrocosms
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and microcosms will be discussed. These elements will explain the complexity of kejawen and 
show the similarities of kejawen to Sufism. First, there will be a brief account of pluralism and 
syncretism, as it exists in Indonesia.
The island of Java exists in a pluralistic and syncretic environment. The idea that there is 
more than one basic principle, and reality consists of two or more independent elements is what 
defines pluralism. This condition is a condition such that, minority groups participate in the 
dominant society while maintaining their cultural distinctions. This definition assumes that 
society will benefit from such a condition (Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 2001: 
1019). Ideally, religious beliefs in a pluralistic environment will co-exist with major and minor 
ideological differences, and they do, however, these differences often lead to conflictions and in 
extreme cases violence. Pluralism exists in virtually every country on the globe. Every nation has 
various ethnicities isolated in given areas in large cities and in rural areas. However, in 
Indonesia, pluralism exists with a large degree of religious syncretism.
Syncretism can be defined in various ways, and can fit in various degrees and levels of 
any given condition. Syncretism can be the attempt to reconcile differences or establish a union 
of opposing ideologies, thus merging two or more opposing categories into one form (The 
Random House Webster’s College Dictionary 2001: 1328). Mulder (1996: 7) notes the 
limitations of syncretism as the universal outcome o f cultural contact, and opts for a larger 
explanation based on a given context. It is agreeable and important to provide a context for 
syncretism; however, a simple definition will suffice if it is understood that religious syncretism 
is a broad and complex condition.
In the case of Java, syncretism is a complex and a reoccurring process that is a constant 
and consistent concept, which relates to cultural reproduction. However, syncretism may not
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necessarily provide a settled or significant outcome (Beatty 1999: 3). This is important to 
understand in terms of religious syncretism and particularly in this case, when the research 
moves to examples of Sufi influences in kejawen and Islam more generally. Both ideologies are 
so intricately entwined that separation may inevitably lead to incompletion or confusion. While 
some aspects of kejawen may differ from Islamic orthodoxy, most aspects of kejawen are 
agreeable to the Sufi form of Islam. When discussing syncretism it is important to understand 
that conflictions seen by the researcher is not seen by the people who are being researched. It is 
as important to accept no resolution than it is to provide an incorrect analysis.
Kejawen
The Javanese worldview is an elaborate system containing a cosmology, a mythology, 
metaphysics, and an anthropology. Together, these areas compile a set of ethical beliefs on how 
one should live their life and what their place is in the cosmological universe. This belief system 
is called kejawen. This system differs from the orthodox portion of Islam and understands the 
outside world as its essential text and the body as its holy book. ‘Orthodox’ Islam, to the 
contrary, promises heaven through the belief in one God, His Prophet, and ritual devotion to the 
Qur’an. (Beatty 1999:158; Mulder 1996: 31).
Javanists can be defined as those who stress their Javanese cultural inheritance as 
primary and view their Muslim affiliations as secondary. These individuals are comparable to the 
Santri-Abangan differences in Islamic piety. For example, in Java there are those who practice 
kejawen at a deeper level and those who do not, and also, there is a broad middle area where 
individuals are indifferent. This provides a high level of flexibility to the Javanese, much like the 
abangan Muslims (Beatty 1999: 159).
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The student of kejawen has a mindset that stresses the notion of reaching an inner truth 
and strength. This is in contrast to the pious Islamic student’s rigid development of memorizing 
doctrine. For a Javanist, true meaning is acquired through insight, which can be spontaneous or 
an acquired skill. This is, likewise, opposed to the strict and rigid memorization that 
characterizes the students of the santri. Most of Javanese spiritualism is done through the acts of 
rasakno dhewe and ngaji. The former is to be told to feel it for yourself while the later is 
translated to recite your own body. The Javanist is never told to think about the mystical truth, 
but rather, to dig, connect, or feel the awareness of what is missed on the surface level of 
existence (Beatty 1999: 161).
Javanists take complex ideas and simplify them so that one can be oriented. Manuals, 
scripts, and even symbols are useless unless one can understand the basic principles that must be 
dibuktelcaken (proven) for oneself. Javanese knowledge is a practical philosophy and lives in 
\ i discussion and practice rather than written texts. The texts are only valuable if the person reading 
them understands his place in the universe. The concept of tradition and passing on knowledge 
has a practical and systematic emphasis that is contrasted with the Santri notion of the truth 
found in scripture. The truth according to the santri is in scripture. This truth is beyond human 
interference and handed down directly from God. The Javanese phrases urip utama and mati 
sampurna means superior life and perfect death. Both are achieved through enlightened actions 
rather than enlightenment (Beatty 1999: 163, 164). Thus, for the Javanist the truth derives from 
the individual and what is found on the inside, versus, what is found in scripture and recitation. 
Scripture and symbols are used as assistance in finding the inner, personal truth. This personal 
truth will result in a union with God.
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The Javanists relationship with God and the world is described through the term rasa 
(feeling). Knowing ones place in the hierarchical social order is reflective of the cosmological 
order and is essential in Javanese thought. The different meanings of rasa; bodily feeling, 
emotional feeling, awareness, inner meaning, or various refractions of God in the human 
consciousness, is a connecting force where God penetrates everything. Rasa is a physical 
sensation and an existing form of a subtle inner life force and a sign that there exists an inner life. 
Rasa is what is beyond the surface and the symbol, and the word that is the meaning of God 
(Beatty 1999: 165; Mulder 1996: 31, 32).
Kejawen is very much rooted in Hindu epics of the Mahabharata tales.11 For example, 
kebatin, which means the cultivation o f ones self and inner being, is central to kejawen. This is 
illustrated with the journey of Bima from the Dewaruci story in the Mahabharata. Essentially, 
Bima’s journey to find the truth is challenging; in the end he encounters himself (Dewaruci) at 
the bottom of the ocean. After Bima enters through the ear of Dewaruci (himself), he becomes 
one with God and finds true meaning. The moral of the story is that only through oneself, can 
one understand the truth and existence of God and the cosmos. Kebatin is the journey from an 
origin to a destination and the re-absorption o f the All. (Mulder 1996: 39,40). The essence of 
kejawen is the idea that everything is part of the same whole, and through the cultivation of the 
inner self, one can understand the truth of everything as one.
The concept of the microcosms and macrocosms in Javanese thinking can be quickly 
described in four primary views. The views are interrelated, however, the Javanese tend to 
choose one or the other. The first is described as a metaphor used to explain the human body as a 
mirror to the world. The human body, then, has its own seas, mountains and sources of light.
11 The Mahabharata is the classical Hindu texts with epic tales of heroes and villains. These tales are reflected in the 
Wayang Kulit (shadow puppet) shows that are popular in Indonesia (primarily in Java and Bali).
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Second, humans are patterned in relationship to the cosmos. Humans are at the center of an 
elaborate cosmology and humans are a key to this complex blueprint. Third, the body and the 
world are designed with anasir papat (the same four elements); earth, wind, fire, and water. Last, 
the world and man exist together (Beatty 1999: 170).
This belief system assists greatly when attempting to understand Javanese thinking. The 
Javanese idea that everything exists as part of a whole, or all is one helps to understand how 
multiple elements can exist in a single region. In Java there can be a 94.1% Islamic population 
with kejawen, the epics of the Hindu Mahabharata tales, and elements of Buddhism. The diverse 
ideologies and religious differences in Java can be brought together because of the ideology of 
kejawen. For the Javanist, if one looks through the surface of contrasting religious ideals and 
seeks to finds the truth of God and the universe, a basic tenant is the idea that everything exists in 
compliment not conflict. According to Mulder (1996: 39), the way to understand this whole, at 
the core, is the cultivation of batin (inner spirit).
Now that kejawen has been discussed there will be an accountability of how kejawen and 
Sufism relate to one another. Sufism is the form of Islam that emphasizes the direct and personal 
experience of God. This personal relationship with God is done through repetitious phrases that 
mention the names of God and intense meditation. This is the spiritual aspect of Islam and a 
balance for the rigid formalization of Sharia. This form of Islam fulfills the spiritual needs of 
human beings and can guide individuals in experiencing the direct relationship to God and God’s 
qualities. If a Muslim belongs to a Sufi group, this group can provide a large sense of spiritual 
comfort. This spiritual comfort will assist this individual when considering existential matter, 
such as the purpose and meaning of life (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 102).
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Sufism and Keiawen
To understand how Sufism and kejawen interact, historical texts can be a useful tool for 
providing a cultural perspective and interaction. Woodward (1989) discusses the importance of 
historical texts when analyzing cultures. Historical texts will illustrate the syncretic nature of 
early religious belief systems and Javanese practices. Historical texts will also show how religion 
can be used as the basis for political influence and motivation. Equally important, however, is 
that texts apply elements of cultural knowledge and these texts are the most detailed statements 
of cultural knowledge that are written from elite experts. According to Woodward, these elites 
can reach into various social classes in Java, while also giving a ‘frozen’ image of how certain 
cultural patterns evolved in the past (Woodward 1989: 49-52).
The origins of Islam in Java are obscure, however, research has shown that Muslims were 
present during the Indie court system of Majapahit as early as the fourteenth century (Woodward 
1989: 8, Ricklefs 1993: 5). While the last Indie kingdom of Majapahit in Java fell in 1478, 
Hindu-Javanese inscriptions were found as late as 1486. While trade was an important factor in 
converting the Javanese to Islam, equally important is the influences of the Sufi ulama and 
Muslim kings who established Islam as the religion of central Java (Woodward 1989: 53).
Woodward argues that Javanese Islam was originally shaped and influenced by the 
combination of the Kerala community in southern India and the Muslim empires of Deccan 
areas of northern India. The former had a large influence from Arab tradition, while the later was 
dominated by the Indo-Persian religion and political structures. Combined, these two influences 
are seemingly the basic elements of Javanese Islam, which consists of elements from the shaft ’ite 
(legal tradition) from southern India and the mystical theory and kingship of northern India. 
Together, both influences have shaped Javanese Islam in contemporary Javanese culture. The
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most reasonable stop between Indonesia and Mecca for both pilgrims and traders is Kerala in 
Southern India (Woodward 1989: 54).
The relationship between the social orders of the Kerala in Southern India can be linked 
to the tradition of the santri communities in Java. More specifically, the ulama centric pesantren 
and madrasah (Islamic education systems) teaching styles in Java reflect the influences of the 
Kerala in Southern India. Both of these communities place a large emphasis on venerated 
Muslim saints, local origins, and ritual specialists. Likewise, the Kerala and Deccan both share 
support towards the abangan Muslims (Woodward 1989: 55, 56). The influences between these 
two communities in northern and southern India are important because it shows the initial 
diversity, complexity, and flexibility of Islam’s entrance into Java. The nature and outcome of 
these influences in Java indicate a heavy emphasis on Sufi mysticism, while also an emphasis 
toward the pious santri.
The areas of interaction between northern and southern India should not be overlooked 
for two reasons. The first is that there is a link between the social and religious communities of 
Southern India’s Kerala and the traditional Javanese santri. Likewise, in both areas there are 
ritual similarities, most notably, the five daily prayers, the Ramadan fasting month, pilgrimages 
to sacred graves, and the slametan.n  The Kerala of southern India provides a potential 
illustration of an influence of Javanese social and religious organization (Woodward 1989: 57).
The large mystical emphasis in Indonesian Islam, however, suggests some researchers to 
argue that Sufi masters were the initial agents to spread Islam in Indonesia. This is because the 
period of Islamisation in Indonesia coincides with period when Sufi’s dominated the greater 12
12 The slametan is a ritual in Java that is held during many life-changing events. It can be used for a number of rites 
of passage and extends to all Javanese of all religions. The Kerala refer to the slametan as the nercha. In both areas 
the types of food are offered and distributed to the names of the spirits of saints in both societies (Woodward 1989: 
57).
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Islamic world. This was after the fall of Baghdad by the Mongols in AD 125813. The first 
evidence of the existence of a Muslim Dynasty in Indonesia was on the Island of Sumatra, just 
west of Java, where a gravestone has been dated to AD 1297 (Ricklefs 1993: 4,12-13).
While Woodward notes the obscurities of the initial spreading of Islam, he is convinced 
that the spread is largely Sufi influenced and, in his argument, Muslim Kings (Woodward 1989: 
54). While there seems to be debate and inconsistency flashpoint of the spread of Islam in 
Indonesia, there seems to be agreement on the heavy Sufi influences in contemporary Indonesia. 
It is this heavy influence that can be applied to the pre-Islamic belief system of kejawen.
The first rise of Islamic states that dominated Java were secular monarchs and self- 
proclaimed saints. On the religious level, this was a contrast between the Kerala system that is 
dominated by Muslim clerics, and on the other side, the Deccan Indo-Persian imperial form from 
northern India. The northern Indian influence in Java suggests that this form of Islam shows the 
influence of the king and kingdom. More specifically, the king represents Allah on earth. This 
Indo-Persian influence of the Sultanate representing Allah on earth is still present in the 
Yogyakarta system in contemporary Java. Likewise, northern Indian influences can be found in 
Javanese ritual, most notably the malud ritual14, which is illustrated through the Persian mystic 
Al-Hallaj. During the fifteenth century Indo-Persian mystical orders spread the doctrine of 
identity. This doctrine illustrates the identity of the creator and the created (the relationship 
between god and man) (Woodward 1989: 58).
Thus, it is possible that the conflict between the legalities and mysticism of Javanese 
Islam derives from the broader Islamic conflict between the mystic and legal scholars. This 
confliction between the legal aspects of Islam and mysticism can be seen in the influences of the
13 The leading researcher for this argument is A.H. Johns (Ricklefs 1993: 12).
14 The malud is a ritual that celebrates the birth and death of the Prophet Muhammad (Woodward 1989: 58).
opposing elements of the Arabic-Keral and the Indo-Persian interpretations. These 
interpretations illustrate the difference between the legal versus mystical interpretations of Islam 
(Woodward 1989: 58). The notion that Muslim traders had little to offer the Javanese elite, 
suggests that the conversion of the Javanese royalty to Islam was the product of Sufi masters 
who had connections to trade (Ricklefs 1974: 4). Considering that Sufism likely had a large 
presence in the elite portions of early Javanese Kingdoms, this would explain the large effects 
Sufism has had in the whole of Java and the greater archipelago.
The above discussion on the confliction between the legal and spiritual aspects of Islam 
in Java is essential when interpreting the fundamental arguments between contemporary forms of 
Islam in Java. Mysticism and ‘orthodoxy’ was and is a primary confliction between the Sufi 
practices and some of the santri. For example, there are those who argue that the way to please 
Allah is through following Sharia and those who emphasize the mystical union of self and Allah. 
The ulama and aspects of Sufi mysticism have been at odds with the basic elements of each 
belief from the earliest Islamic Kingdoms to contemporary Java. While some of the ulama see 
Sufi practices as a compromise for converting local masses and view the relationship between 
Allah and man as that of servitude, the Sufi’s understand the personal relationship with Allah as a 
union through submission (Woodward 1989: 60).
The orthodox view of Islam supported by the ulama versus the mystical aspect of Sufism 
can explain the practices and compliments between kejawen and Islam. While the orthodoxy of 
Islam is fundamentally rooted in the Qur’an and depicts the rigidity of the model of religious 
scripture, it does not provide an ordered set of categories on cosmology, ethics, ritual and various 




body of law. The Hadith15 and the Sharia are aspects not found in the Qur’an and are subjected 
to the interpretations of what the prophet approved and disapproved of. Orthodox Islam is largely 
influenced by non-Muslim traditions, such as the very notion of ‘orthodox’ and ‘purity’. What 
researchers have shown is that the prophet Muhammad provided for Sufism, not Sharia 
(Woodward 1989: 60, 61).
The analysis of the initial influences of Sufism in Java is important for this paper because 
it provides the division between Islamic ideologies and these influences that can be found in 
contemporary ideological disagreements. For example, the conflict between mysticism and 
legalities in Islam has been engaged in the past and in the present. This argument can be seen in 
the notion and concept of an Islamic state and the role Islam should play in Indonesian politics. 
Zainal Abidin Ahmad a leading modernist and Masyumi politician argues that the Prophet 
created an Islamic state and his companions continued this State. Whereas M.A. Sahal Mahfudh 
(president of NU) warns of implementing sharia without contextual consideration, according to 
Mahfudh, the implementing of sharia lies with the individual Muslims in the course of their 
everyday lives (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 157,158,210, 211).
In the case of Java and Indonesia more generally, it is important to mention the 
uniqueness of Islamic scholars, more specifically, the kyai of the pesantren (Islamic learning 
centers). Early pesantrens taught Islamic law, theology and Sufism. Contrary to the rest of the 
Muslim world, the Javanese pesantrens produced Islamic scholars who were both masters in 
Islamic theology and jurisprudence, while also earning the title of a Sufi, master. Rather than 
ulama versus Sufi scholar, as per post Islamic modernism, these scholars adopted the term kyai to 
represent competence in both areas of Islam (Dhofier 1999: 14).
15 The Hadith is a usually short narrative that explains what the Prophet Muhammad approved and disapproved of. 
The Hadith and Sharia give aspects to Islamic doctrine and legalities that are not found in the Qur’an (Woodward 
1989: 61)
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In other areas of Islamic development such as the Middle East, the area of jurisprudence 
and Sufism tended to develop separate leaders. While in Java the two areas were combined, so 
the kyai was a master of Islamic jurisprudence as well as Sufi mysticism, to create a new, albeit, 
advanced and evolved, Islamic scholar or kyai. The training the kyai has in Sufism, Islamic law, 
and theology was then passed on to the their students, the santri (Dhofier 1999: 14). This is 
important because these scholars have a combined knowledge of the two opposing areas of 
Islam, legalities and mysticism.
To illustrate the aggregation between Sufism and kejawen, there are certain universal 
principles that are used to interpret and receive tradition, local culture, and religious knowledge 
in Java. These universal principles have four basic tenants; Tawhid (the unity of Allah), batin 
and lahir (distinction between inner and outer meanings), rabb and gusti (the relationship 
between god and humanity), and the equation of the microcosms and macrocosms shared by 
Sufism and the kejawen traditions (Woodward 1989: 69, 70).
Mulder (1996: 31-33) makes it emphatically clear that kejawen is not a religion but a 
practice; however, Mulder’s description is isolated within the wording and context of a religious 
belief system. His observations fall short because, it does not note that kejawen can be extended 
to every aspect of Javanese life. While Mulder shows the elements and beliefs that constitute 
kejawen as a ideology, there lacks the explanation of the practical emphasis. The scope of 
kejawen extends to social, political, mystical, and idealistic realms in the Javanese belief system 
(Endraswara 2003: 6, 8). This gives kejawen the flexibility to not only compliment a religion, but 
also assist in political, economic, and social decision- making.
In terms of Sufism and kejawen, Beatty (1999) illustrate that kejawen can augment 
Sufism, while also having a practical and applicable world-view (Endraswara 2003: 6, 8). The
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adherence of kejawen to Sufism can be found in the cardinal descriptions of rasa, order, the 
relationship between God and Humans, and the microcosms and macrocosms. The connection 
between Sufism and kejawen indicate that Sufism allows for an agreeable understanding between 
both practices. Islamic doctrine and orthodoxy such as Sharia, does not provide as much for the 
kejawen worldview (Woodward 1989: 69-74).
The concept of tawhid (Unity of Allah) is the central and arguably the most important 
doctrine in the Islamic faith. The ulama link tawhid with sharia centric piety, while the Sufi’s 
understand tawhid as a personal relationship. The three levels of the tawhid are those who have a 
basic Islamic belief (i.e. the belief in Allah), those who strongly practice Islam, but seek personal 
gain and blessing, and those whose primary motive is to serve Allah. This last level is one 
agreeable element between the orthodox ulama and the Sufi mystics. Essentially, to serve Allah 
unconditionally is the ultimate non-existence of everything that is not Allah, kejawen mystics 
understand the notion of kosong (empty) in a similar sense, which is that anything other than 
Allah (including thought), is eliminated. The goal of the Javanese mystic is always with the 
infinite power and ever-present nature oiAllah (Woodward 1989: 70-71).
Similarly, the Javanese concepts of batin (inner) and lahir (outer) existence are 
comparable to the Arabic terms batin and zahir. In Sufi texts these terms outline the behaviors
expected by the Qur’an, and with the inner mystical path to seek the knowledge of Allah. The 
interpretation of the wadah and isi are concepts that can link kejawen and Sufism. The wadah 
being a container and the isi being the content, the wadah is the physical, for example the 
universe, the body, the state and so forth. The isi is Allah, the Sultan, the soul, faith, and 
mysticism. In terms of the Javanese mystic, this may imply to what degree a Javanese mystic 




The last two areas to discuss are kawula and gusti (the servant/Lord relationship) and the 
microcosm and macrocosm equation, both have been discussed in the context of kejawen. Recall 
that in Javanese society and mysticism, cosmology is viewed as a hierarchy, and the term rasa 
has great importance (Beatty 1999: 165; Mulder 1996: 31, 32; Woodward 1989: 73). The 
relationship between god and man is central in Javanese religious thought and political theory. In 
Islam, the servant and Lord relationship centers on the concept of submission to Allah (Islam) 
and to orthodox ulama this means perfecting your relationship as a servant to please the needs of 
Allah (the master). To the Sufi mystic it is a union with Allah, the submission eventually equates 
to an understanding through a union. The Javanese use this in a broader sense and extend it to 
political theory, social hierarchy, and mystical thought. In Java, most santri do not accept the 
kejawen ox Sufi position of a union with Allah as a metaphysical condition. (Woodward 1989:
75).
The microcosms and macrocosms of the Sufi tradition and Javanese kejawen complement 
each other, however, there are also elements of Hindu/Buddhist beliefs in that the equation 
reflects the geography and organization of the States. The Sufis, however, believe that the center 
of God and Human relationships are the hearts of the people. The Ka ’bah (heart) is the house of 
god and the center of the cosmos, which equates to the center of creation. Allah and humanity are 
reflecting images, so the difference between the Hindu/Buddhist and Sufi tradition is the nature 
of the cosmos. In Java, Yogyakarta for example, the state and the palace are models of the 
cosmos. In Java, these elements are combined. The state (Yogyakarta for example) is modeled in 
a cosmos that is Islamic, while at the same time kejawen and Sufi mystics view humans as a 
mirror to Allah s attributes (Woodward 1989: 76, 77). The four central areas of Sufism can be 
used to show the links between the Sufi form of Islam and the concept of kejawen.
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The importance of the analysis of kejawen and Sufism can be shown in varying aspects of 
Javanese culture. One large and important area is in the initial development of Indonesian 
political discourse. That is, the initial development of politics within Indonesia as an independent 
nation. Now that a background of the political environment and Islamic organiztions have been 
addressed, and an analysis of the importance of Sufism and kejawen have been discussed, there 
can be an example of how these elements interacted in the initial development Indonesia’s 
constitution.
More specifically, what was the role and level of influence from Islam during this period? 
The following section will discuss Islam’s role in Indonesia’s political discourse and president 
Soekamo’s political ideology. The former will reflect the role of Islamic more generally, while 
the later will consider the influences of Sufism and kejawen in the ideological beliefs of 
Soekamo.
Sufi and Javanese ideology During initial Political Discourse
“7 am a convinced nationalist, a convinced Moslem, a convinced Marxist. My heart overflows 
with the synthesis o f these three currents, and for me it is a mighty synthesis... ”16 -Soekamo-
This portion of the paper will explain the weighted influence of Sufism and kejawen 
found in the initial political development in Indonesia. With the early developments of Islamic 
organizations in mind, we can note their participation in the development of Indonesia’s 
constitution. This portion will discuss Indonesia’s first president Soekamo, his background, his 
isolation, and his pancasila ideology. The discussion on Soekamo will reflect his views on Islam 
and his role as a nationalist leader. The leader Soekamo will bring together the influences and
16 In Dahm, Bernhard 1969 Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence. Trans. Mary F. Somers 
Heidhues. Pp. 200
McCabe 29
the role of Islam to explain the initial political developments, and the outcome of the nation of 
Indonesia. More specifically, added to the ideologies of nationalism and Islam, Soekamo also 
combined the influences of Marxist-Communism.17
The example of Soekamo will bring the elements of kejawen and Sufism into the political 
discourse because; Sukarno was capable of utilizing the mysticism of Islam and kejawen to 
appeal to the elite and common Indonesians.
Pancasila was the creation of a political policy that mediates nearly every element and 
ideology present in Java at the beginning of Indonesian independence. Sukarno’s pancasila was 
the basis for the Republics constitution then, and still exists as the foundation of Indonesia’s 
Republic today. Pancasila was developed to cater to pluralism; tolerance, Islam, and Marxism 
yet it has restricted the amount of Islamic influence, more specifically, the institution of an 
Islamic state under Sharia law (Bharadawaj 1997: 63, 64).
Sukarno and Pancasila
Once the proper conditions emerge, and a parliament o f our own, truly representative o f  
the people, has come into being, the Sarekat Islam must not then end its activity; rather, it must 
continue to work for the strengthening o f democracy and ofIslam in Indonesia, and for the 
abolition o f capitalism. What use is a government o f our own i f  it is still controlled by adherents 
o f capitalism and imperialism?18
17 Communism is encompassed in the works of Karl Marx (the Communist Manifesto 184) and Friedrich Engels (the 
Principles o f Communism). Both authors participated in the works of the Communist Manifesto; the primary goal 
was class struggle and rebellion by the common people. Marxist-Communism is a model of government designed to 
destroy the upper class and free the lower class from oppression. Communism also requires the abolishing of religion 
and the absolute morality that religion defines. Historically, Communism has shown to result in totalitarian regimes 
that become increasingly oppressive to the people that Communism was written for. Communism and Marxism are 
interchangeable and have the same meaning. Source: http://www.allaboutphilosophv.org/communism.htm
18 Sukarno, UH, May 6, 1921 (IPO 1921, No. 19, P. 263), as this reference was used in the translated version of 
Bernard Dahm’s Sukarno and the Indonesian Struggle for Independence, translated by Mary F. Somers Heidhues, 
1969 Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.
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W In the nineteen hundreds when Islamic organizations were becoming involved in both the 
political and social arena, Indonesia’s most influential and charismatic leader was, likewise, 
making his presence on a national level. Eventually making his mark on the international stage, 
Soekamo would become the charismatic face and leader of Indonesian nationalism. A leader is 
essential and indispensable in any revolution, whether political, religious, or social the role of the 
charismatic leader is a large factor when unifying various elements, many of which are at odds 
(Bharadwaj 1997: 63, 64). This section will integrate the influences of Sufism and kejawen that 
led to Soekamo’s pancasila ideology.
More specifically, how this ideology brought together the various elements and factors 
discussed previously, combined with elements of Marxism and communal Javanese ideologies.19 
Soekamo’s background assisted in the unification of three opposing ideologies under the theme 
of Indonesian nationalism using a Javanese background. This example will also indicate how 
Islam’s diverse system can exist in an equally diverse environment. This accountability of 
Soekamo’s ideology will show the role of Sufism and Kejawen in the initial drafting of 
Indonesia’s constitution and identify the initial division between the notions of Islam and the 
Indonesian state.
Charismatic leaders have been considered in a variety of conditions, the common 
elements of a charismatic leader include a diverse background, high levels of vitality, 
intelligence, motivation, and originality that can attract the masses of large populations. The 
leader must be able to attract the common; less educated, while also convincing the elite and the 
intellectuals (Bharadwaj 1997: 65-66). Soekamo is a perfect example, particularly when
19 Communal Javanese ideologies will refer to gotortg royong (mutual cooperation), which is a village concept that 
requires mass cooperation from villages to accomplish one or more overarching goals (Karen! Indonesian Course 
Book 2 pp. 152 and Legge 1979: 186).
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discussing the importance of Javanese ideology. The diversity of Soekamo’s background, 
coupled with his ability to unite opposing ideologies is what made Soekamo an effective 
nationalist leader.
Soekamo’s early education and political influence is essential in understanding the 
outcome of his pancasila ideology. Soekamo did not attend a pesantren, but rather, after the age 
of twelve, attended European schools, which introduced him to a diverse amount of recourses. 
From his birth, Soekamo was raised under a Javanese father and a Balinese mother, where he 
was taught traditional Javanese culture and the mles and behavior of the Javanese nobleman. 
Soekamo was also well versed in Hindu epics, which reflects in his later political campaign with 
Wayang performances. This Javanese background gave Soekamo the ideologies of mysticism, 
religious/syncretic tolerance, and the precepts of kejawen (Bharadwaj 1997: 72-73).
Soekamo’s early political influence adds to the diversity of his background. His initial 
political education was in Surabaya, east Java in the house of Tjokroaminoto, the founder of 
Sarekat Islam . Indeed, m the early years Soekamo’s ‘mirror’ was Tjokroaminoto, however, it 
must be made clear that Soekamo’s primary political course was always nationalism, not Islam. 
Soekamo was allowed to develop his nationalistic views within the backdrop of Islamic and 
communist activities. His leadership, however, did not lean far to one ideology, but rather 
attempted to bridge the major differences as ‘misunderstandings’ between ideological 
interpretations. Soekamo effectively placed himself as the unifier of these differing ideologies. In 
the excerpt above, Soekamo implies the dominating presence of the nationalism and socialism of 
the 1900’s, the abolishment of capitalism, a leaning toward communism, but a blatant 
strengthening of Islam (Dahm 1969: 43). 201
20 Wayang performances are shadow puppet plays that reflect epic Hindu tales. The form Wayang Kulit is popular in 
Java and Bali.
21 The first mass organized Islamic group that preceded Muhammadiyah.
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The role of Islam in Soekamo’s leadership began with his early political education from 
Tjokroaminoto and continued when he moved to unite, and create synergy between, nationalism, 
Marxism, and Islamic ideologies. In the context of Soekamo’s ideology, and indeed the 
nationalism of the time, Islam was often seen as the symbol of self-reliance and western 
rejection. Soekamo understood the challenges of linking nationalism with Islam and Marxism 
and he demonstrated his political abilities by simply confronting the Muslims, the Marxists, and 
the Nationalists (Bharadwaj 1997: 72, 73).
Soekamo laid out the rise and decline of Islam and compared this to developments in 
Indonesia (i.e. reformation) during the 1900’s. Soekamo pointed to Islam as being responsible 
for western dominance; Islam’s decline was the result of the usurping of last Caliphate by secular 
governments. Thus, it is a misconception for the Marxists to hold hostility toward Islam (because 
Marxism is centered on secular governance). However, nationalism in Islam can be drawn out 
with the Muslim irritations toward the infidels. Conveniently, most of the infidels are not 
Indonesians they are the occupiers. This instills nationalist’s feelings that will allow the 
compatibility between Nationalism, Marxism and Islam (Dahm 1969: 72).
Moreover, the Marxist ideology of redistribution is compatible with the Islamic notion of 
zakaP  both concepts contain socialistic elements. Then, Soekamo turned to the Marxists and 
using Marxist jargon to prove his worth, assured the Marxists that calling for an end to 
nationalism and religious associations has been overruled by a greater cause.2 34 The role of 
Marxism, then, is cooperation with both nationalists and Muslims. Praising the cooperation
22 Infidel refers to the non-believer, or one who rejects the blessings of God, literally means one without faith. 
htto://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Infidel
23 Zakat is essentially, the Islamic definition of redistribution and one of the five tenants of Islam, where the richer 
Muslims are responsible for assisting the poorer Muslims in an Islamic society.
24 By Marxist Jargon I am referring to terms that are familiar to Marxists, such as surplus value, accumulation, and 
pauperization (Dahm 1969: 71).
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between the Marxists and Muslims in Afghanistan, Soekamo presented examples of cooperation 
W ' between Marxists, nationalists, and Muslims in various circumstances. Soekamo brought all
ideologies together and stressed national autonomy and the liberation of Indonesia is the primary 
goal, not the dismissal of ideologies (Dahm 1969: 72, 73).
Although Soekamo believed in Allah, he did not follow strictly, a religious dogma other 
than kejawen. Kejawen allowed Soekamo to access many belief systems, with a wide range of 
ideologies. It was during Soekamo’s exile from the mid 1930’s to the early 1940’s on the Island 
of Flores, that he began writing to a sympathetic Muslim (A. Hasan) of the Presuatan Islam 
(Islamic Unity) in Badung. It is during exile that Soekamo began to read and consider Islamic 
ideology more thoroughly. From the beginning, Soekamo intensely criticized the idea of sharia 
on the condition that Islamic law completely dominates and overshadows the belief system 
(Dahm 1969: 179-180). Soekamo’s initial criticism sharia is valuable because it shows an initial 
rejection of orthodoxy. The consideration towards spiritualism and the rejection of orthodoxy 
will prove consistent in Soekamo’s version of Islamic relevance.
While the utilization of Islam could be linked to Sukarno’s strong kejawen ideology, he 
was also looking for a way to promote and sustain nationalism for Indonesian independence 
without the institution of sharia and an Islamic state. Soekamo adopted the idea that Islam is 
progress, contrary to the common question posed by scholars that asks, “Is Islam hostile to 
progress?” Soekamo eventually attacked the book of the Fikh, which, is a 1000-year-old book 
that has guided the everyday moral and ethical decisions of Muslim and the Muslim community. 
Even still, Soekamo referred the Fikh as the ‘hangman of the soul and spirit of Islam’. As Dahm 25
25 The Fikh is a book of Islamic legal teachings that has guides the behavior of Muslims over the course of one- 
thousand years (Dahm 1969: 192).
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claims, Soekamo’s interpretation of Islam was not so much based on ‘submission* as it was 
‘progression’ (Dahm 1969: 191-195).
The important element to consider is Soekamo’s quick rejection of orthodox Islam. What 
is the implication of this rejection? For Soekamo, this rejection could mobilize Muslims into 
revolution, while also limiting the legalities of Islam in initial State and governmental political 
developments. By appealing to the mystical portion of Islam, Soekamo could give momentum to 
the Muslim majority (particularly secular Muslims), while ensuring early on, that Islam’s role in 
legal aspects of the independent state would be limited. Soekamo’s purpose was not to alienate 
the various forms of Islamic views, but rather, to unite and put to rest the controversy of the 
variants of Islam. As Soekamo understood this, the controversies must be put to rest through the 
spirit rather than the dogma, as Dahm (1969: 192) illustrates:
Let us not look at the letter; let us look at the spirit, the soul o f the letter...In this way we 
can free Islam from the controversy over the letter, that is, the casuistry o f the Faqih. In this way, 
we can think independently, comment independently, interpret independently, guided only by the 
one compass, the spirit o f [true] Islam.26
Two important issues must be addressed by Soekamo’s proclamation and interpretation 
of Islam being an ideology of freethinking and personal relationships with Allah. First, it was not 
setting well with modernists (Mohammed Natsir for instance) who were quick to point out his 
deficiencies. This primary deficiency is a lack of devotion and submission to the will oi Allah, 
which is the foundation of Islam. Secondly, the primary target for Soekamo’s criticism, the 
orthodoxy (NU members for example), would eventually show interest in Sukarno’s emphasis on 
the necessity of syncretism in local belief systems (Dahm 1969: 195-196).
26 As translated from Dahm 1969, pp. 192.
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This is important because it shows how Soekamo adopted Islam as a form of nationalism, 
while at the same time taking a form of Islam that will seemingly prevent an Islamic state. 
Soekamo’s Javanese background has reflected his ability to bring together nationalist, Marxist 
and Islamic ideals into a kejawen framework. This framework, as understood by Soekamo was 
looking through the surface of all ideologies and seeing them as compliments rather than 
conflictions. This framework and Soekamo’s exploration of mysticism can be compared to his 
kejawen background and his partiality towards Sufi mysticism. It is this unity through diversity 
that is the foundation and the core of Soekamo’s pancasila ideology.
The Japanese occupation is what brought Soekamo out of isolation and to the center of 
the political arena as the leader of the Indonesian independence movement. Unlike the Dutch, the 
Japanese ran a highly political, mass organizational, and largely ritual/ideological occupation.
For Soekamo, this was ideal for the manipulation and shaping of a political platform (Legge 
1979: 149).
Towards the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945, the organization of the BPKI 
(Investigating Body for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence) committee was formed to 
consider all aspects of political, administrative, and religious affairs to create an independent 
Indonesian state. In this committee, secular nationalists compromised 34%, while the Muslim 
intellects occupied only 11%. The territorial administrative corps and members drawn from the 
other main ethnic groups of Indonesia compromised the rest of the committee. It was through 
this committee that Soekamo was able to secure more power and influence to the secular 
nationalists (Legge 1979: 183).
The first preliminary assembly gathered on the 28 th of May 1945. In the initial gathering, 
the BPKI was in danger of losing its momentum and was very slow in addressing decision
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making and planning. This is when Soekamo stepped in and extinguished the arguments to give
W ' one of the most motivating speeches of his political career. This speech brought together
Soekamo’s ideology and political thought over the course of his twenty-year activity (Legge 
1979: 183,184). With the influences of nationalism, Marxism and Islam, Soekamo promoted his 
pancasila ideology under the kejawen precept of everything exists as one. This took the diversity 
of the ideologies of Marxism and Islam and intergraded both under the ideology of nationalism. 
Nationalism is what combined the struggle from the northern tip o f Sumatra to Papua. These 
struggles do not exist independently, rather in cohesion under one nation state, Indonesia (Legge 
1979: 184,185).
Pancasila, or the five principles declare the belief in one God, a just and civilized society, 
national unity, democracy led by wisdom, and social justice (Fealy and Hooker 2003: xiv). 
Soekamo synthesized nationalism, Islam and Marxism by dissecting his five-fold ideology.
\ ^ /  Essentially he illustrated that these five principles are interrelated and dependent upon one
another. Indeed, if Soekamo compressed these ideologies from five, to three and from three to 
one, the parts of pancasila is really one overarching whole. This interrelationship is reciprocated 
with the Indonesian term gotong royong (mutual cooperation) (Legge 1979: 186).27
Soekamo was effective in gaining support for pancasila because of his intellectually 
diverse background. The role and influence of kejawen is shown through Soekamo’s ability to 
illustrate the compatibility, rather than the contradictions in each ideology and show the 
dependence on each ideology for the common goal of nationalism. By using the Javanese 
concept of gotong royong, Soekamo was able to appeal to the Marxist and the Islamic notion of
27 Gotong royong is translated as cooperation, but it is much more than that. In Indonesian villages, or desa, the 
entire community comes together to do accomplish various things such as, the harvest, re-building or fixing things in 
the community and so forth. This illustrates the socialism that influenced Sukarno (Karen! Indonesian Course Book 
2 pp. 152).
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zakat (redistribution with socialist elements), while also appealing to the less-educated rural 
elements using a identifiable term. Through the precept of everything is one from kejawen and 
the notion ofgotong royong, the example of Soekamo illustrates Bharadwaj’s (1997: 65-66) 
definition of the common elements of a charismatic leader.
The Muslim intellects, however, were discouraged by a number of things. Most notably 
the recognition of other religions, when Indonesia was nearly 90% Muslim, and with certain 
reactions Soekamo had toward the non-secular Muslim minority. For example, at one point 
Soekamo emphasized that the non-secular Muslims held 11% of the BPKI and this minority 
would reflect in the political decision making of the committee. Essentially, Soekamo told the 
non-secular Muslim minority to understand their place. Thus, after the euphoria of Soekamo’s 
charismatic speech faded, there were conflictions between the secular and non-secular Muslims 
on the practicalities of Islam involved in state ideology. This was inevitable because, while 
Soekamo’s speech was motivating and inspiring, it lacked in specific practicalities, most 
specifically, the role of Islam in the ninety percent Muslim majority nation of Indonesia (Legge 
1979: 186,187).
The first major division concerning Islam’s role in political Indonesia was the Djakarta 
charter. When the BPKI formed the sub-committee (chaired by Soekamo) to draft the 
constitution, the primary concern was the Djakarta charter. This was the first large confrontation 
between Islamic groups supporting and opposing an Islamic state (Legge 1979: 188; Fealy and 
Hooker 2006: 47). The Djakarta charter was seven words in bahasa Indonesian that allowed for 
the institution of sharia law for those who practiced Islam (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47).
The wording of the Djakarta charter was vague and did not stress the implication for 
those who were orthodox Muslims and those who were abangon (nominal) Muslims. Would
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Sharia be instituted to all Muslims or just the orthodox Muslims? Was it to be enforced by the 
state? Moreover, there was no specificity in defining an Islamic state and ultimately, while one 
committee accepted the Djakarta charter, it was dismissed by another committee and did not get 
included in the final draft of the Indonesian constitution (Legge 1979: 188; Fealy and Hooker 
2006: 47).
In the development of Soekamo’s national ideology, the non-secular Muslims did not 
gain the influence they had hoped for. There was a minority of non-secular Muslims in the BPKI 
and the Djakarta charter failed to be included in the Indonesian constitution. While Soekamo 
was a Muslim, his primary goal was nationalism, and his views on Islam as a political influence 
was only to assistance in independence. As far as Islam and non-secularism is concerned, 
Soekamo clearly sided with the secular Muslim nationalists and opposed an Islamic state.
Soekamo’s partiality towards secularism is shown earlier in Soekamo’s political career 
when he renounced the Fikh and non-secular Islamic ideology. Both he considered, as clouding 
the tme nature of Islam. However, Sukarno was able to effectively motivate and unite differing 
ideologies under the precepts of kejawen, the cooperative term gotong royong, and the concept of 
nationalism. These areas encompassed the diverse ideologies present in Indonesia during the 
drafting of the Indonesian constitution, while also appealing to the masses. The notion and 
implementation of an Islamic state was set aside and left out of the constitution and is the first 
major confliction between those Muslims who support an Islamic state and those Muslims who 
do not (Dahm 1969: 191-195; Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47).
McCabe 39
Conclusion
In this paper there was a consideration of Islam’s initial influences and level of 
involvement in the early political development in Indonesia. A background of Islam and how 
Islam exists in Indonesia, with specific attention to Java, was discussed (Armstrong 2002: xiv, 
25; Momen 1985: 12; Fealy and Hooker 2006: 39-41,49; Mulder 1996: 31; Beatty 1999: 1). The 
political environment of the early 1900’s to 1945 in Indonesia was discussed with an emphasis 
on diverse political ideologies, Islamic organizations, and Soekamo’s pancasila ideology. There 
was also a consideration of the misunderstandings between classifications of Muslims that have 
recently dominated literature and research (Dahm 1969: 195-196; Feith and Castles 1970: 1,123, 
201; Kahin 1952: 64, 87-88, 106-111, 156; Ricklefs 1993: 171; Barton and Fealy 1996: 1-13,17- 
21).
The analysis of the form of Sufism and kejawen gave an understanding of the early Sufi 
influences in Java that may have been a combination of Northern and Southern Indian 
influences, or the product of the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in AD 1258. On the one hand, 
there is a reflection of the orthodox ulama and kyai, while on the other hand, the mystical Sufi 
practices. The early Sufi influences in Java helped to explain the complexity and division of 
ideologies between the doctrinal practices of the Mystics versus the Islamic clerics (Woodward 
1989: 54-56; Ricklefs 1993: 4,12-13). The kyai are a unique form of Muslim scholars who are 
well versed in the legalities of Islam as well as Sufi masters. This allows the kyai the diversity 
and knowledge to understand the entirety of Islam, both in a spiritual and practical sense 
(Dhofier 1999: 14).
The close relationship between Sufism and kejawen has shown compatibility and the 
ideology of kejawen extends to religious, political, and social ideologies (Endraswara 2003: 6,
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8). Because of kejawen’s flexibility, various religions and ideologies can exist together without 
the resolution between various doctrinal discrepancies. Kejawen and Sufism are closely linked in 
terms of cosmology, mythology, metaphysics and their anthropologies. The Javanese extend the 
practice of kejawen to political theory and this can be exemplified by Soekamo’s use of 
combining differing ideologies under nationalism, using the basic kejawen precept of everything 
existing as one ideology.
To show how kejawen and Sufism played a role in initial political discourse, the 
nationalist leader and first president of Indonesia, Soekamo; proved to be an ideal example. This 
was due to his diverse background and upbringing in the traditional Javanese lifestyle 
(Bharadwaj 1997: 63-66, 72-73). While Soekamo did not place a large emphasis on Islam until 
his isolation, there he chose to side with the mystical aspects of Sufism while rejecting Islam’s 
legalities and jurisprudence. It is through the rejection of orthodoxy that illustrates Sukarno’s 
motives. By dismissing orthodoxy and embracing mysticism, Soekamo could effectively limit an 
Islamic state and create synergy between differing ideologies (Dahm 1969: 72, 73,179-180,191- 
196). Soekamo accomplished this synergy by finding the underlying compliments rather than 
focusing on the contrasts. According to Soekamo, it is the mystical form of Islam rather than its 
orthodoxy that represents the true nature and spirit of the Islamic religion.
Soekamo’s pancasila ideology extended this notion and condensed Soekamo’s political 
ideology over the course of his twenty-year trek. Soekamo pushed pancasila as a political and 
ideological philosophy that accepted all influences during this period of Indonesian history. 
Soekamo’s knowledge of Marxist-communism, Islam, and nationalism effectively allowed him 
to condense these ideologies (as he saw them) into one using, once again, the precept of oneness 
and gotong royong. With the kejawen ideology and the communal village notion of gotong
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royong (mutual cooperation), Soekamo instituted his pancasila ideology into the last paragraph 
^ 0/ of the Indonesian constitution (Legge 1979: 183-186).
Islam’s role, more generally, was divided. This first division in the initial development of 
Indonesian politics was over the Djakarta Charter, which proposed to implement Sharia law on 
the 88% Muslim majority. The secular Muslims prevailed in the initial political process because 
the non-secular Muslim only occupied 11% of the BPKI. Therefore, the non-secular minority 
were sidelined and marginalized in the final draft of the constitution. The failure of the Djakarta 
Charter to be implemented illustrates this defeat (Legge 1979: 186, 187; Fealy and Hooker 2006: 
47).
By understanding the political environment in Indonesia from the early twentieth century 
to the drafting of it’s constitution, while also integrating the origins and belief systems in Java 
(Sufism and kejawen), one can begin to understand how a leader such as Soekamo could develop 
the policy of pancasila. Moreover, by addressing the various forms of Islam, while weighing 
heavily towards Sufism, one can see the level of influence mysticism has in Java. This also shows 
how Islam more generally, can exist and maintain a balance in an area where there is a high level 
of diversity, pluralism and syncretism. Thus, with the background of the political environment, 
the analysis of Sufism and kejawen, and a discussion of Soekamo’s pancasila we can see that the 
influence of Sufism and kejawen on the political policy of pancasila contributed greatly in early 
Indonesian political discourse. The role of Islam more generally, is a more problematic question.
As mentioned the role of secular Muslims had a much larger role in the initial political 
process in Indonesia. This could be in large part, because of Soekamo’s heavy role as a 
nationalist and secular leader. However, within the large Islamic organizations such as NU and 
Muhammadiyah, there are heavy numbers of Muslims that found the idea of an Islamic state
W
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problematic. For example the pragmatists in the traditional Muslim group NU. Soekamo’s 
V  ideologies appealed to the moderate and there are large portions of moderate secularist Muslims 
within NU and Muhammadiyah. This ensured that the role of non-secular Islam as a political 
force would be minimized.
However, the belief in one God statement in pancasila could be seen by the non-secular 
Muslims as an advantage, because, this statement assumes that this one God is Allah, given that 
Indonesia is 88% Muslim. But, the Djakarta Charter was a significant set back for the non­
secularists and will prove to continue to be minimized in the future (Fealy and Hooker 2006: 47). 
Thus, in terms of the role that Islam played in the initial development of the Indonesian 
constitution is more complex. The amount of Muslims involved during the development of 
Indonesia, as a nation state is, of course, the majority. Within the BPKI there was a clear Muslim 
dominance, however, what form of Islamic ideology is what must be considered. More 
vw v specifically, how the varying Muslims interpret the role of Islam in state society is more accurate 
than simply saying, what is the role of Islam in Indonesian politics?
When studying political Islam in Indonesia a sufficient place to begin is during the 
revolution and independence period. This is when the country of Indonesia and the religion of 
Islam developed into a political force. The divisions between the traditionalists and modernists 
during the initial development of the constitution are also present in contemporary Indonesian 
society. The notion of the State and Islam are still contested from both angles. Islam in Indonesia 
is still evolving internally, and its dynamics is becoming increasingly complicated.
I chose the Indonesian independence period as a starting point. To attempt an analysis of
W
contemporary Islamic politics in Indonesia, it is necessary to consider how Islam, and what 
forms of Islam, contributed to the initial development of Indonesia as a nation state. There are
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many other ways to consider the various forms of Islam. In all considerations, Indonesia can be a 
primary example of how Islam exists among diversity, pluralism, and syncretism.
w
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